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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the U.S. Navy's involvement in the defense buildup program
by focusing on Department of the Navy procurement budgets during fiscal years 1981
through 1989. Appropriated Budget Authority for five DON procurement appropriations
are examined for the major trends exhibited during this period.
The data collected for the nine year period, FY 1981 through 1989, indicated that
Department of the Navy procurement budgeting, primarily incremental in nature, is
significantly affected by other factors. The trends exhibited by the procurement
appropriations indicated sensitivity to DON funding levels as well as to explicit policy
changes by Congress and the President. These trends emphasize the need for precise
planning, programming, and budgeting by the Navy to ensure the necessary resources are
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In April 1980 the U. S. Army's elite Delta Force suffered
a humiliating defeat without a single shot fired. An
attempted rescue of American citizens held hostage in Iran had
ended in dismal failure. The blame for the failure, in the
minds of Delta Force personnel, rested with the RH-53 Sea
Stallion helicopters used in the aborted rescue
attempt.[Ref. 1]
The Sea Stallion helicopters were incapable of making the
900 mile flight from the USS Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman to the
hostage site in Tehran without stopping to refuel. It was
during this refueling stop, at a location called Desert One,
that disaster struck. One of the Sea Stallions crashed into
a parked EC-130 Hercules and ended the rescue attempt. Two
other Sea Stallions had already aborted the mission due to
mechanical difficulties. The crash of the third helicopter
left an insufficient number to successfully carry out the
mission so the rescue attempt ended in failure.
Was this just a freak occurrence or was this an indication
of a lack of readiness and ability by the U. S. military
forces to perform required missions? Was the U. S. investing
a sufficient amount of money to maintain a capable armed
force? Many people, at that time, believed the U.S. armed
forces to be ill prepared to execute the duties required of
1
them. In fact, a Newsweek poll taken in 1980 indicated that
seven out of ten Americans did not feel the U.S. was keeping
pace with Soviet power and influence. Other reports indicated
the Soviet Union had been investing substantially more money
in their military forces. [Ref. 2]
In spite of this criticism, a review of U. S. Department
of Defense (DOD) budgets discloses huge sums devoted to DOD
investment. During the two decades, FY 60 - FY 80, DOD
Procurement Budget Authority (BA) totaled more than $420
billion and averaged 26.0 percent of the total DOD $1.6
trillion budget.
However, in response to the perceived investment
deficiency, a substantial increase in defense procurement took
place during the Reagan administration. Between FY 1981 and FY
1989, President Reagan's administration embarked on the
largest peacetime military buildup in U. S. history, as the
country attempted to find satisfactory answers to the
questions of military preparedness. During this eight year
period, DOD procurement BA equalled $708 billion or 30.6
percent of a total DOD budget of $2.3 trillion. This
represented an increase in DOD procurement BA over the
previous two decades of 59.3 percent in current dollars. Total
DOD spending during the same period increased by only 43.8
percent over the FY 60 - FY 80 period. [Ref. 3]
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A. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
This thesis will examine the U. S. Navy' s involvement in
the defense buildup program by focusing on DON procurement
budgets during fiscal years 1981 through 1989. Major trends
will be highlighted and a comparison of budget requests to
actual funding received will be made.
B. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The compilation of DON procurement budget data is limited
to historical Budget Authority figures for the period fiscal
year 1981 through fiscal year 1989. Outlay figures were not
used because it was assumed that Budget Authority are more
indicative of intentions and , therefore, do a better job of
signalling changing initiatives by the President and Congress.
C. LITERAVIME REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Preparation of the data base involved primarily
information collection from the Budget of the United States
Government for fiscal years 1980 through 1989, from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense's National Defense Budget
Estimates, other official government publications and
Congressional Budget Office analyses. A thorough review of
literature concerning DON financial resources was conducted
and yielded several sources cited in the body of the study.
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D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter I provides a general description and direction of
this study. Chapter II moves to background information on the
DOD in President Carter's last year in office and as President
Reagan took over. Chapter III describes the data base used
and the results of the study. Chapter IV explains the results
in terms of major trends identified. Finally, Chapter V
offers conclusions drawn from the study,
4
I. BACKGROUND
A. DOD PROGRAM AS REAGAN TOOK OFTICE
As President Reagan took office in January 1981, the
headlines in leading newspapers and magazines reported
deficiencies in readiness within the U.S. armed forces. Prior
to his election, candidate Reagan claimed the U.S. had not
kept pace with the Soviet's military buildup. [Ref. 2]
Experts contended that Moscow had invested $240 billion more
than the U.S. during the dF.cade of the 1970's resulting in a
Soviet numerical advantage and a narrowing of the U.S.
technological advantage. It was argued that USSR missile
guidance systems had so improved that a "window of
vulnerability" had developed that threatened the U.S. with
nuclear blackmail due to a potentially successful Soviet first
strike capability. [Ref. 2]
President Reagan's campaign had included a promise to
build U. S. defense to the point that no other nation would
dare challenge the U.S. militarily. Building military
capability requires investment in aircraft, ships, tanks, and
other types of equipment as well as spending to recruit,
train, and retain personnel. Investment by the military is
accomplished primarily through procurement and research and
5
development. Funds for these purposes are granted by
Congress through procurement appropriations and research and
development appropriations. Investment by the Navy in
aircraft, ships, and other naval equipment, which played a
part in the Reagan defense buildup, will be examined in the
following chapters.
This chapter will briefly examine the status of the DOD at
the beginning of the Reagan presidency through a review of the
budgets for FY 1960 through FY 1980, a review of President
Carter's FY 1981 budget, and a look at some of the changes
instituted by the Reagan administration to correct perceived
deficiencies. It will also detail the size of the U. S. Navy
at the beginning of the defense buildup and the Reagan
administration's proposed changes to Naval forces and
structure.
B. DOD BUDGET FROM 1960 - 1980
In 1960, Department of Defense Budget Authority stood at
$40.9 billion or approximately 44 percent of the total Federal
Budget. By 1980, this share had decreased to slightly more
than 24 percent. DOD BA equaled about 8.1 percent of Gross
National Product (GNP) in 1960 and about 5.3 percent in 1980.
Converting these numbers to constant FY 1990 dollars shows DOD
BA as 10 percent of GNP in 1960 and 5.3 percent in 1980. [Ref.
3]
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Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, in hi6 FY 1980 Annual
Report to Congress, sketched the size of the DOD which he and
President Carter hoped to maintain. The FY 1980 Budget
reflected President Carter's influence and helped to shape the
scope and nature of the DOD inherited by the Reagan
administration.
Secretary Brown's sketch included active duty forces,
Reserve and National Guard forces, as well as overall DOD
budget figures. Because of their relatively small size and
impact, non-active duty forces and budget figures are not
included in the discussion that follows in this study.
The FY 1980 report estimated the approximate number of
personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces, as shown in Table 1, at
2,073,000. According to Secretary Brown's report, the U.S.
possessed 2122 strategic delivery vehicles consisting of 1709
missiles and 413 bombers. The Army had 16 divisions and 5
separate brigades. The Marine Corps consisted of 3 divisions.
As indicated in Secretary Brown's report, there were 6136
aircraft among the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft
squadrons. These included airlift, and defensive as well as
strategic and tactical squadrons. The Navy owned
approximately 460 major naval combatant, amphibious, and
auxiliary vessels, according to the report.[Ref. 4]
Secretary Brown's report stated that in real terms,
operating expenses for military forces had remained relatively
constant during the period 1964 to 1980 due mainly to a
7
TABLE 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFINSE MNPOWER
Active Duty Military
(End-Strength, in Thousands)
FY Army Navy MC AF Other Total
1960 873 618 171 815 - 2,476
1961 859 627 177 821 - 2,484
1962 1,066 666 191 884 - 2,808
1963 976 665 190 869 - 2,700
1964 973 668 190 857 - 2,687
1965 969 672 190 825 - 2,655
1966 1,200 745 262 887 - 3,094
1967 1,442 751 285 897 - 3,377
1968 1,570 765 307 905 - 3,548
1969 1,512 776 310 862 1 3,460
1970 1,322 692 260 791 1 3,066
1971 1,123 623 212 755 1 2,714
1972 811 881 987 726 1 2,323
1973 801 564 196 691 1 2,253
1974 783 546 189 644 1 2,162
1975 784 535 196 613 1 2,128
1976 779 524 192 585 2 2,083
1977 782 530 192 570 4 2,077
1978 771 530 191 569 5 2,067
1979 758 522 185 559 8 2,032
1980 777 527 188 555 23 2,073
Source: National Defense Budget Estimates for
FY 1990/1991, Office of the Assistant Sec. of
Defense (Comptroller), March 1989.
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significant drop in manpower. The 2,073,000 personnel
estimated for FY 1980 was down from 3,066,000 a decade
earlier, a drop of almost one million.
These manpower figures indicated the general trend in the
shrinking of DOD that had taken place during the 1960's and,
especially, the 1970's. Table 1 shows that active duty
manpower started the 1960's decade at less than 2.5 million,
grew to more than 3.5 million by 1968, then steadily decreased
to just over 2.0 million in 1980.
This general trend is supported by budget figures for the
period. Figure 1 displays DOD BA in current dollar terms as
a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP). It shows DOD's
share of GNP to have decreased steadily for more than twenty
years before reversing by FY 1980.
A look at only DOD procurement budgets for the same time
period presents a mixed picture. In current dollars, DOD
procurement BA rose from $17.9 billion in FY 1960 to $35.3
billion in FY 1980. However, in constant FY 1990 dollars,
procurement BA decreased from $62.0 billion in FY 1960 to
$53.2 billion in FY 1980, a drop of approximately 16
percent. [Ref. 3]
Secretary Brown commented on this downward trend with
respect to investments when he reported that the DOD in 1980
was living mainly off investments made in the early 1960's.
[Ref. 4] The FY 1980 budget planned to reverse this trend by
substantially increasing defense investment spending.
9
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President Carter's FY 1980 budget included $135 billion of
new BA or enough for about a 3 percent growth in real terms.
The projected defense spending for FY 1984 was set at 4.7
percent of GNP compared to 12 percent and 8.2 percent of GNP
for fiscal years 54 and 64 respectively.[Ref. 4]
C. THE BEGINNING OF THE 1980'S BUILDUP
President Carter's FY 1981 DOD budget, inherited by Ronald
Reagan, sought to continue the reversal of the downward trend
in military investment spending. This budget reflected
different priorities than Carter's FY 1980 budget and real
growth was concentrated in procurement. The significant
10
difference between FY 1980 and FY 1981 was in terms of
BA. [Ref. 5] The budget requested $17.0 billion in procurement
Budget Authority, an increase of 6.9 percent over FY 1980.
With this budget, President Carter and Secretary Brown were
responding to adverse trends in military spending during the
1960's and 1970's.
D. DOD UNDER REAGAN
The size of the Department of Defense that President
Reagan inherited in 1981 was approximately the same as that
reported to Congress by Secretary Brown in his FY 1980 Annual
Report. The number of personnel had increased slightly to
2,101,000, while the number of ships, aircraft, missiles, etc.
were essentially unchanged. [Ref. 4]
Even though President Carter's FY 1981 budget projections
for the outyears anticipated real growth in DOD BA, P:xesident
Reagan's administration proposed sharply higher increases in
its submissions to Congress. The FY 1982 budget, transmitted
to Congress in March 1981, contained substantial increases
over amounts included in the previous year's budget. A
supplemental appropriation request for FY 1981 was also
submitted that restored many Carter Administration cuts to
defense programs concerning combat readiness and the strategic
balance. [Ref. 6]
Candidate Reagan had called for massive changes to
President Carter's resource allocations and Reagan's FY 1982
11
budget submission stressed mainly procurement and research and
development appropriations.[Ref. 7] Reagan's FY 1983
budget proposed continuance of increased investment for the
next five years. His administration proposed an increase
during FY 1983 to FY 1987 in tanks, helicopters, and aircraft
for the Army and Marine Corps, as well as a 600 ship Navy. His
proposals amounted to more than $1.6 trillion in defense BA
during this time period, a 50 percent increase over the
previous five years.[Ref. 5] Reagan's FY 1988 and FY 1989
budgets continued to request real growth in defense spending
despite opposition in Congress.
Defense BA in current dollars increased significantly
during the 1980's, by 86 percent between FY 1981 and FY 1989.
The increase measured in FY 1990 constant dollars was only 35
percent, still a significant increase. Defense BA in FY 1990
dollars peaked in FY 1987, then declined for the next four
years and is projected to continue to decline in coming yoars.
[Ref. 4] The Congressional Budget Office projects that
defense BA will decline by 19 percent in real dollars between
FY 1991 and FY 1995, a loss of $70 billion inflation-adjusted
dollars and $237.5 billion current dollars.[Ref. 5] The DON
also experienced similar budgetary swings in resources as
discussed in the next section.
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E. THE NAVY BUDGET IN 1981
As Reagan came to office the Navy was experiencing as many
troubling problems as the other branches of the armed forces.
The number of major ships had shrunk from more than 1,000 in
1970 to less than 500 at the end of 1980. [Ref. 4] Funding for
the Navy had decreased from $76.5 billion in BA in FY 1970 to
$71.2 billion in FY 1980, a 7 percent decline in real terms
(FY 1990 Constant Dollars).
The Navy's procurement budget had grown, in current
dollars, from $11.6 billion in 1960 to $35.3 billion in 1980.
As Table 2 shows however, in constant dollar terms, Navy
procurement budgets actually decreased slightly during this
period, from $55.5 billion to $53.2 billion. This decline was
in line with the general downward trend for DOD discussed
earlier.
The Reagan administration proposed that, of the defense
budget increases in coming years, the most significant
expansion should be centered on the Navy. The bulk of this
increase would be in ships, aircraft, weapon systems, and
other investment items. [Ref. 4] Increased purchases of
investment items required increases in DON procurement Budget
Authority. The remaining sections of this thesis will discuss
DON funding for procurement between FY 1981 and FY 1989 and
how funding requests, in terms of BA, compared to the funding
actually received from Congress.
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Chapter III will present a discussion of the major
procurement appropriation accounts within DON and their
associated historical data for fiscal years 1981 through 1989.
Trends within these data will be highlighted and summarized
in Chapter IV. The final chapter will provide conclusions
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Source: Budget of the U.S. Government, fiscal years 1981-
1989, U.S. Governement Printing Office, March 1989.
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III. DATA BASE
A. SOURCES AND EXPLANATIONS
The primary source of budget data used in this study was
The Budget of the United States Government, published annually
by the U. S. Government Printing Office. Substantial
additional data were obtained from the National Defense Budget
Estimates for FY 1990/1991 prepared by the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
This chapter discusses the five major procurement
appropriations found in the Department of the Navy (DON). The
five categories are Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Weapons
Procurement, Navy, Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, Other
Procurement, Navy, and Procurement, Marine Corps. These five
categories account for the bulk of DON investment and are
shown in Appendices A and B, including Net Financing
activities. Net financing activities include funds from prior
years in each of the procurement categories that are available
for funding current year expenditures or require current year
funds to cover prior year expenditures.
The remainder of this section provides an explanation of
each of the procurement appropriation categories as defined by
The Budget of the United States Government, beginning with
definitions of appropriation and authorization.
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1. Authorization and Appropriation
An authorization is legislation passed by Congress that
establishes the purpose and guidelines for a given activity
and usually sets a limit on the amount that can be spent but
does not provide the actual dollars. [Ref. 8]
Authorizations provide the legal authority, by subject, for
which funds may be appropriated.
An appropriation is legislation by Congress that enables
an agency or department to make spending commitments and
actually spend money. [Ref. 8] Appropriations may be less than
the amounts authorized but are not supposed to exceed the
authorized amounts. An explanation of the five major DON
procurement appropriations follows.
2. Major DON Procurements
The Aircraft Procurement category includes funds for
construction, procurement, production, modification, and
modernization of aircraft and equipment. Also included are
funds for aircraft ordnance and accessories.
The Weapons Procurement category refers to funds for the
construction, procurement, production, modification, and
modernization of missiles, torpedoes, other weapons, and
related support equipment and spare parts. This category
funds the purchase of strategic and tactical missiles, target
drones, and ship's guns and the costs of modernizing these
items already in service in the Navy.
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The Shipbuilding and Conversion category appropriately
provides funds for the construction, acquisition, or
conversion of vessels as authorized by law including their
armor and armament. This category provides funds for plant
equipment, machine tools and installations in public and
private plants for ship construction and conversion.
Other Procurement, Navy funds procurement, production, and
modernization of support equipment and materials not otherwise
provided for by other procurement appropriations. This
category includes ordnance (except ordnance for new aircraft,
new ships or ships undergoing conversion) and ammunition as
well as funds for the purchases of passenger motor vehicles.
The final category is Procurement, Marine Corps. This
category is for the expenses associated with the procurement,
manufacture, and modification of missiles, armament,
ammunition, military equipment, and spare parts and
accessories used by the U. S. Marines. It provides the Marine
Corps with weapons, ammunition, missiles, combat vehicles, and
communications and support equipment for use by the ground
element of the marine general purpose forces.
The figures used in this study are Budget Authority (BA)
granted by Congress for each fiscal year. BA is defined as an
authorization to enter into obligations for payment of
Government funds. Most BA is provided by Congress in the form
of appropriations and reappropriations which can be increased
or decreased by transfers to or from another account.[Ref. 3]
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BA is used in this study because it is an accurate
measurement of the budgeting associated with DON budget
requests and because it is a primary indicator of new
initiatives and total buying power provided by Congress and
the President.[Ref. 5] Since a large percentage of the BA
granted by Congress is discretionary, it clearly highlights
new spending decisions.
DON current procurement Budget Authority figures (Appendix
A) are converted into 1990 constant dollars (Appendix B) using
Department of Defense deflators for Budget Authority taken
from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)'s National Defense Budaet Estimates for FY
1990/1991,, Appendix C. All dollar totals are in millions of
dollars unless otherwise indicated.
S. RESULTS
A look at the aggregate numbers shows that DON procurement
BA, in current dollars, rose from $20.3 billion in 1981 to
$31.0 billion in 1989. This represents an annual average
increase of $1.2 billion. In constant dollar terms, the total
rose from $28.2 billion to $31.9 billion.
Although procurement BA dollars rose during this period,
as Figure 2 shows, it declined as a percentage of total DON
BA. Procurement BA stood at 35 percent of total DON BA in
1981, increased to more than 43 percent in 1983, then
decreased to less than 32 percent in 1989.
19
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FY 90 constant dollars reflect similar swings. The
corresponding increase to $44.2 billion in fiscal 83 from the
$28.2 billion in fiscal 81 was a 57 percent change, but by
fiscal 89, the change had dropped to only a 13 percent
increase.
A discussion of each procurement category beginning with
the Aircraft Procurement appropriation follows. Included in
t7he discussion of each category is a compa:ison between
dollars requested and dollars appropriated.
20
1. Aircraft Procurement (APN)
The Aircraft Procurement appropriation is subdivided
into seven subcategories. These are combat aircraft, airlift
aircraft, trainer aircraft, other aircraft, modifications to
existing aircraft, spares and repair parts, and support
equipment.
Budget Authority for aircraft procurement increased
steadily from FY 1981 through FY 1985, then decreased
throughout the remainder of the decade. Table 3 shows that
Aircraft procurement began the decade at $6.3 billion and
ended the decade at $9.3 billion, an increase of 49 percent in
current dollars. Figures in Table 3 do not contain the net
financing amounts included in the Appendices and, therefore,
do not add to the totals shown.
TABLE 3
Aircraft Procurement
(in millions of current dollars)
8._ 8__2 83 84 85 86 8.L 88 89
Combat 4076 6022 6297 6185 6034 5762 6430 5570 5794
Airlift 37 101 279 189 238 209 118 18 2
Trainer 56 74 50 31 103 199 77 375 80
Other 45 73 76 174 120 507 298 433 360
Mods. 693 910 1161 1140 1773 1181 1656 1207 900
Spares 1096 1527 1959 1728 1334 1181 1669 1350 1179
Support 251 313 424 392 628 629 551 509 540
Totals 6254 9028 10184 10159 10898 10496 9868 9032 9342
Source: BudQet of the U. S. Government, fiscal years
1981-1989, U. S. Government Printing Office.
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In constant dollars the increase was not so dramatic.
The increase was from $8.7 billion in FY 1981 to $9.6 billion
in FY 1989, an increase of only 11 percent. Aircraft
procurement averaged 5.17 percent annual real growth over this
nine year period. Only the Other Procurement appropriation
category had a smaller real growth during this decade.
Combat aircraft received the largest share of the
aircraft procurement budget throughout the FY 1981 to FY 1989
period, averaging $5.8 billion per fiscal year. This average
was more than $4.0 billion dollars greater than the next
highest category, Spares and Repair Parts. This category's
second largest share of the procurement budget was an annual
average of $1.4 billion.
2. Weapons Procurement (WPN)
Budget Authority for purchases of weapons systems
increased dramatically during the 1980's. Its current dollar
increase, shown in Table 4, was from $2.8 billion in FY 1981
to $6.5 billion in FY 1989, an increase of more than 220
percent. The growth in real terms was an equally dramatic 163
percent.
A comparison of Budget Authority requested by the
administration and the actual Budget Authority provided by
Congress is made in Table 8 at the end of this chapter. Funds




(in millions of current dollars)
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 _8 89
Bal. Mis. 876 926 667 616 265 550 1351 1533 2160
Oth. Mis. 1341 1576 2024 2012 2823 3248 3069 2968 3103
Torpedoes 327 473 509 563 597 428 602 662 974
Oth.Weap. 194 191 1596 157 188 159 283 100 110
Spares 0 0 0 0 0 83 150 109 110
Totals 2766 3166 3447 3772 4353 4971 4991 5372 6457
Source: Budget of the U. S. Government, fiscal years
1981-1989, U. S. Government Printing Office.
in FY 1981 and FY 1982 but fell below requested amounts for
the remainder of the decade.
Purchases of missiles, both ballistic and other types,
accounted for more than seventy to eighty percent of the
weapons procurement appropriation. The lowest total was 70
percent in FY 1984 and the largest percentage was 84 percent
in FY 1987.
Dollars for ballistic missiles rose through out the
decade and came to represent more than 41 percent of total
missile purchases by FY 1989. Dollars for procurement of
other missile types fluctuated throughout this period. Table
8 compares requested BA for Weapons Procurement to the amounts
actually granted by Congress. As can be seen, appropriated
amounts exceeded requested amounts for the first two fiscal
23
years. Thereafter appropriated amounts were less than the
requested amounts.
3. Shipbuilding and Conversion (SCN)
Procurement dollars appropriated by Congress for
Shipbuilding and Conversion experienced significant swings
during the 1980's. An examination of Table 5 will show that
the subcategory of Shipbuilding and Conversion reached its
peak dollar amount in FY 1983 and then climbed to its second
highest total of the decade five years later in FY 1988. After
climbing to over $15.0 billion in FY 1988, Shipbuilding and
Conversion dollars dropped by 72 percent in FY 1989, to only
$10.8 billion.
The Other Ships subcategory received by far the
greatest proportion of Shipbuilding and Conversion dollars.
This subcategory, which funds the purchase and overhaul of
attack submarines and nonballistic missile surface ships,
consistently received more than 40 percent of the total with
an annual average of $6.9 billion from FY 1981 to FY 1989.
The funding of Ballistic Missile Ships, which includes
Trident submarines and ballistic missile capable surface
ships, received an average $1.1 billion annually or about 11
percent of each year's total Shipbuilding and Conversion
budget. The second largest share, with an annual average of





(in millions of current dollars)
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
Bal. Ships 1134 331 1527 1262 861 1076 1710 1125 1226
Oth. Sh ps 3494 5141 11810 4682 5815 5245 7440 12188 6700
Amph. Ships 388 340 469 1225 495 900 419 834 591
Mine. Ships 1510 996 760 606 469 389 247 71 380
Misc. Ships 1092 1795 1455 1644 1448 1222 1915 831 1901
Totals 7618 8603 16021 9419 9088 8832 11731 15049 10798
Source: Budget of the U. S. Government, fiscal years
1981-1989, U. S. Government Printing Office.
The granted Budget Authority compared to the requested
Budget Authority is provided in Table 8. Appropriated amounts
again exceeded requested amounts in FY 1981 and FY 1982, but
then fell below requests for fiscal years 1983 through 1988.
In FY 1989 however, Congress provided funds for Shipbuilding
and Conversion in excess of administration requests.
4. Other Procurement (OPN)
Table 6 provides the actual BA granted by Congress for
each of the subcategories of the Other Procurement
appropriation. The items purchased by these funds are
equipment not otherwise provided for and include eight
subcategories.
The Communications and Electronic Equipment




(in millions of current dollars)
81 82 83 8_4 85 86 87 88 89
Sh. Supt. 675 687 534 604 719 763 959 723 698
Coms. Eq. 1054 1155 14130 1465 1386 1657 1860 15468 1411
AV. Supt. 370 561 566 560 913 867 877 748 553
Ord. Supt. 597 827 694 853 1054 1069 1040 926 785
CEC Supt. 74 111 170 144 237 275 219 120 94
sup. Supt. 69 76 88 58 94 78 88 81 94
Pers. Eq. 191 212 228 205 386 430 590 447 469
Spares 0 0 0 0 0 141 279 267 542
Totals 3030 3629 36668 4323 5342 6103 5803 4357 4646
Source: Budget of the U. S. Government, fiscal years
1981-1989, U. S. Government Printing Office.
shore communications equipment, received the largest share of
this OPN budget with an annual average of $1.4 billion. The
next three largest shares went to Ordnance Support Equipment,
Ship Support Equipment and Aviation Support Equipment
respectively. Funding in current dollars for these
subcategories rose during the FY 1981 to FY 1989 period by a
collective 24 percent. This can be compared to the increase
in the Other Procurement category as a whole of almost 55
percent.
Table 8's comparison indicates a similar pattern, as
shown in the previously discussed appropriation categories, of
requests exceeding appropriations for FY 1983 through FY 1989.
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Also following a similar pattern, the FY 1982 appropriated
amount was greater than the requested amount. Not following
the pattern, the fiscal year 1981 appropriated amount fell
below the requested figure.
5. Procurement, Marine Corps (PMC)
Funding in the Procurement, Marine Corps appropriation
category grew from $0.5 billion in FY 1981 to $1.3 billion in
FY 1989. Table 7 lists the seven subcategories that comprise
the Procurement, Marine Corps appropriation.
TABLZ 7
Procurement, Marine Corps
(in millions of current dollars)
81! 82 83 84 5 86 87 88 89
Amunition 82 307 449 419 538 486 552 372 80
Weiapons 99 433 4460 362 426 125 117 978 180
Missiles 101 214 240 161 275 262 234 297 325
Coms. Eq. 91 322 434 304 280 220 356 312 278
Supt. Veh. 87 152 186 293 233 303 176 81 21
Other Eq. 47 281 206 202 118 175 185 187 129
Spares _0 0 0 0 0 26 37 44 62
Totals 507 1709 1961 1743 1817 1558 1434 1213 1292
Source: Budget of the U. S. Government, fiscal years
1981-1989, U. S. Government Printing Office.
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Ammunition for small arms, grenade launchers, motors,
artillery, and tanks was the subcategory that received the
largest percentage of Budget Authority in this
appropriation, with an annual average of $0.4 billion.
Average annual funding for the next three largest
subcategories, Weapons and Vehicles, Guided Missiles, and
Communications Equipment, was about even at $0.3 billion, $0.2
billion, and $0.3 billion each.
Appropriated Budget Authority dollars for the Procurement,
Marine Corps category are compared to requested amounts in
Table 8. The pattern established by the Aircraft Procurement,
Weapons Procurement, and Shipbuilding and Conversion
categories is repeated, with the exception of FY 1989. In
that year, unlike these three other categories, appropriated
funds exceeded requested funds.
6. Appropriated versus Requested Dollars
Table 8 indicates that total procurement dollars
appropriated in FY 1981 and FY 1982 were greater than
requested amounts by $3.3 billion and $5.2 billion
respectively. Appropriated amounts were again greater than
requested amounts in FY 1988 and FY 1989. Appropriated budget
authority exceeded requested budget authority by about $2.0
billion in FY 1988 and about $0.6 billion in FY 1989.




(in millions of current dollars)
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
Requested 4966 6962 11583 11128 11475 11794 11437 9935 8793
Appropriated 6254 9028 10184 10159 10898 10496 9368 9038 9342
Requested 2319 2717 3902 4028 4651 5155 5762 6015 5727
Appropriated 2766 3166 3447 3772 4353 4971 4991 5372 6086
Requested 6119 6641 18648 12700 13143 11209 11975 10769 10230
Appropriated 7720 8638 16137 11484 11636 10350 9042 15851 9573
O:
Requested 3081 3460 3970 5001 5954 6220 6662 5227 5004
Appropriated 3030 3629 3666 4323 5341 6103 5803 4357 4685
13w:
Requested 468 1172 2301 1852 1979 1727 1565 1402 1157
Appropriated 507 1709 1961 1743 1817 1558 1434 1213 1292
Totals:
Requested 16952 20952 40403 34709 37200 37431 36549 33878 30329
Appropriated 20277 26170 35395 31481 34045 33478 30638 35831 30978
DIZIe0eme. -3325 -5210 5008 3228 3155 3953 5911 -1953 - 649
Source: Budget of the U. S. Government, fiscal years
1981-1989, U. S. Government Printing Office.
years 1984 through 1987. Total appropriations reached a
current dollar high in FY 1988 at $35.8 billion. The peak
year for administration procurement budget requests was FY
1983, at $40.4 billion.
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C. SUMRARY
The preceding data discloses the overall increase in
procurement dollars in terms of both current and constant FY
90 dollars. Total DON procurement budgets actually began
increasing in FY 1978 and FY 1979 and continued erratic growth
through out the 1980's. The largest single year increase
occurred in FY 1983, when total DON procurement appropriations
grew by more than 35 percent over the FY 1982 total. FY 1989
had the sharpest one year decline in budget authority with a
drop of 14 percent from FY 1988.
A total of $268.0 billion was appropriated by Congress for
DON Procurement from FY 1981 through FY 1989, an average of
$29.8 billion per year. The Shipbuilding and Conversion
category received $100.4 billion or roughly 37 percent of this
total. Aircraft procurement received the second largest
amount at $75.7 billion or 28 percent of total dollars
granted. The Other Procurement category garnered $40.9
million, for 15 percent of the total. Weapons Procurement was
a close fourth with 14.5 percent of the total at $38.9
billion. The category receiving the smallest percentage
during this period was Procurement, Marine Corps at only 4.5
percent or $11.9 billion.
While granting these procurement dollars, Congress
exceeded budget requests in FY 1981 by 8 percent, in FY 1982
by almost 25 percent, in FY 1988 by 6 percent, and in FY 1989
by only 2 percent.
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The following section of this study provides an analysis
of the budget figures and a possible explanation as to why
Congress granted Budget Authority in excess of requests during
the fiscal years cited.
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IV. ANALYSIS
An examination of the distribution of funds among the five
procurement categories reveals their similar trends.
Reviewing the aggregate figures indicates that procurement
fared best during the early growth years of the budget build
up. It also sustained cuts in funding when total DOD budget
growth leveled out and then declined during the build down
years, but remained substantially above FY 1981 totals
throughout this period.
Other studies[Ref. 9] (Ref. 10] have
indicated this sensitivity of Procurement to the availability
of funds. It gets the largest increases when funds are
abundant, and sustains the largest decreases when budgets are
declining when compared to the remaining components of the DON
budget.
Arnold Kanter postulated an explanation for this in his
article, "Congress and the Defense Budget:1960-1970".
[Ref. 11] He suggested that Congress made larger
changes to Procurement because it is easily broken down into
areas which can be individually evaluated. It is, in other
words, the most "politically visible" category of defense
spending. This presumably would facilitate adding programs
during periods of increased military spending and also make it
easier to cut programs when funding became tighter.
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Benson's study [Ref. 9] suggested that DON budgeting was
basically incremental in nature but areas receiving particular
attention from the Navy fare better than others at the hands
of Congress. Procurement was one of the budget categories
that did not lend itself completely to incremental budgeting
analysis as a means Qf explaining significant changes She
suggested that political events played a major role in
determining budgets and budget shares. These events are said
to include unemployment, inflation, industrial profits, and
general economic conditions existing at tie time budgets are
being settled by Congress.[Ref. 7]
The procurement data presented in this study tend to
support the suggestions that incremental budgeting is the
primary but not the only important factor in setting budget
shares. Each of the DON procurement budgets for the first
three years during the 1981 to 1989 period experienced sharp
increases over the year immediately preceding it. FY 1981's
increase of 28 percent, in current dollars, over FY 1980 was
exceeded by FY 1982's increase of 29 percent over FY 1981,
which, in turn, was exceeded by FY 1983's 35 percent increase
over FY 1982. These big jumps in Budget Authority seem to
suggest that something other than incremental budgeting is
required as an explanation for the changes.
The large budget increases early in the Reagan
Administration helped to forge an overall trend upward in
procurement dollars during the 1980's. The decade had its
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first declining year when FY 1984 decreased by Rlmost 11
percent from FY 1983's peak. FY 1985 returned procurement to
an upward trend with an 8 percent increase over 1984. Even
though FY 1986 and FY 1987 were years when procurement dollars
declined, the drop was not enough to alter the general trend
upward.
FY 1988 again pushed the trend upward through its 17
percent growth. FY 1989 ended the period with a negative 14
percent growth but left the decade with a positive average
annual growth of almost 15 percent in current dollar terms.
Even in constant FY 90 dollar terms, DON procurement
experienced an overall average annual growth of more than 12
percent during this period. The Congressional Budget Office's
(CBO) analysis of the President's budget published in March
1990 substantiates this significant peacetime growth.[Ref. 5]
Procurement Budget Authority is graphically depicted in
constant dollars in Figure 3. Each of the five appropriation
categories are graphed as well as the total DON procurement
Budget Authority.
The graph shows that Aircraft Procurement followed the
general upward trend but did not exhibit wild swings from year
to year. The budget for aircraft procurement leveled out in
the latter 1980's, indicating that the number of aircraft
being purchased was not increasing. Spending on combat
aircraft in particular fell back almost to the funding levels
found at the beginning of the build up period.
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Aircraft Procurement funding increased significantly
during the build up to correct deficiencies in Naval aircraft
readiness that resulted from lean budget years in the latter
1970's. If the present pattern of funding should turn even
further downward, the Navy may again begin to experience
similar declines in readiness. In an effort to prevent this
degradption, the Navy requested $9.3 billion in Aircraft
Procurement Budget Authority in FY 1990 and $9.8 billion in FY
1991. This level of funding would maintain the average
operating level at approximately the FY 1989 level of 5000
aircraft. [Ref. 12]
The pattern for Weapons Procurement was also steadily
upward, with relatively mild increases and decreases. Spending
on strategic missiles made a large contribution to this
growth, reflecting the Navy's strong nuclear capability. With
the Trident II program resuming full rate production in FY
1991, this emphasis is likely to continue despite growing
criticism of this policy in view of changing world
conditions.[Ref. 13]
The Other Procurement category showed a similarly
steady decade-long pattern. This category ended the decade
with approximately a 15 percent growth over its FY 1981 total.
This mild but steady growth pattern may reflect the lack of
the glamorous appeal that aircraft and weapons procurements
exhibit in their ability to garner large procurement dollars.
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The trend for Procurement, Marine Corps appears almost
flat, but, in fact, did experience an annual average real
growth of about 36 percent from FY 1981 through FY 1989. This
trend ended with the FY 1990 and FY 1991 budgets, as was
predicted by the CBO. [Ref. 5]
The category with the most interesting graphical pattern
was the Shipbuilding and Conversion appropriation. Figure 3
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Figure 3
shows that this category's Budget Authority increases and
decreases closely parallel those of the total DON procurement
budget. With the goal of 600 ships apparently gone, the trend
for the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy proc rement budget
will probably continue to follow the DON total procurement
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budget as it heads downward in conjunction with the proposed
DOD downsizing in the 1990's.
Budget cutting has brought into question spending on new
weapon systems such as the Trident II missiles and the
purchase of new SSN-21 attack submarines. If the Navy
continues to deploy expensive new weapon systems such as
these, the means to pay for them must be determined. This is
especially true if the upward trend in Budget Authority of the
1980' is at an end.
Spending reductions in other appropriations, such as
Operation and Maintenance, Navy, is one method that may be
adopted to provide dollars to meet procurement budget
requirements. A worst case result of this approach could lead
to deficiencies like the "hollow force" of the 1970's that the
Reagan build up helped to correct.
The climate surrounding the DON in the early years of the
Reagan presidency was one of perceived deficiencies. Congress
was ready to deal with the deficiencies and proceeded to do so
by appropriating funds to correct the "hollow force" problems
in Naval preparedness. Considering the climate at the time,
Congress's propensity to alter budget shares that are
relatively easy to change, and the administration's emphasis
on military investments, procurement was an attractive target
for additional dollars.
Pumping dollars into procurement not only put Congress at
the forefront of meeting the challenge of Soviet military
37
investment but also affected those political events that hit
home with the voters. Procurement dollars means jobs for
constituents and each member of Congress must face constituent
pressure to maintain these jobs. The reasons help explanation
why Congress, in some years, appropriated dollars in excess of
administration budget requests in the midst of the largest
peacetime build up in U.S. history.
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V. CONCLUSION
Budget Authority for DON procurement grew substantially
during the FY 1981 to FY 1989 period. Procurement
appropriations for Aircraft Procurement, Weapons Procurement,
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Other Procurement, and
Procurement, Marine Corps all paralleled the upward trend
exhibited by total DON procurement dollars.
At least four conclusions may be drawn from this study of
DON procurement budgets that took place during the Reagan
presidency. First, the use of Budget Authority figures
provides an effective tool for analysis. Budget Authority
accurately reflects total buying power of DON procurement
funding. It is easy to see when changes in initiatives and
policies by Congress and the President have taken place by
analyzing changes to Budget Authority levels.
These changes affect the budgeting and related political
processes associated with DON procurement policies and thereby
overall DON policies and goals. Sharp increases in Budget
Authority requests by the administration for DON procurement
budgets during this period reflect the renewed emphasis placed
on the Navy as a principal player in the contest between the
two world Superpowers.
Congress signalled its agreement with this emphasis by
appropriating Budget Authority in excess of administration
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requests in FY 1981 and FY 1982. This change in policy is
especially reflected in the Budget Authority dollars devoted
to aircraft and shipbuilding categories as Congress and the
administration pursued the goal of a 600 ship Navy made up of
15 carrier battle groups.
A second and related conclusion that may be drawn is that
procurement budgeting is not exclusively incremental in
nature. The DON procurement budget, as complex as it is, does
not lend itself to complete reviews during each annual budget
cycle. This complexity makes some incremental changes
necessary. The study pointed out, however, that sharp changes
in the percentage of the total DON Budget Authority allocated
to procurement are more likely to be explained by policy
changes initiated by Congress and the President than by annual
incremental budgeting.
The relative sensitivity of Don Procurement budgets to
changes in the availability of funds is the third conclusion
substantiated by this study. In the early years of the build
up, when both Congress and the administration aggressively
pursued increased military budgets, DON procurement Budget
Authority expanded rapidly. Likewise, when overall military
budgets began falling and dollar supplies tightened, DON
procurement also declined significantly. The early large
increases permitted DON procurement Budget Authority to
maintain a positive growth trend during the 1980's, despite
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negative real growth in some middle and later years of the
decade.
The Navy began the decade of the 1980's in relatively poor
condition. The Navy was not alone, as the other members of
the Department of Defense had experienced similar difficulty
in successfully accomplishing their missions. A highly
publicized military failure in the Middle East brought these
defense environment deficiencies into clear focus for many
Americans. The failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt pointed
out deficiencies in both the Army and the Navy.
Declines during the 1970's in manpower and budgets
exacerbated problems associated with the equipment soldiers,
sailors and airmen had available for use. Procurement budgets
were inadequate to provide for the weapon systems necessary to
meet U. S. obligations. At a time when it was believed that
the Soviet Union had been investing heavily in military
hardware, U. S. procurement budgets had headed in the wrong
direction.
President Reagan came to office with campaign promises to
not only restore the balance in defense spending between the
U. S. and the U.S.S.R., but to put the U. S. ahead to stay.
His plans intended to place the U. S. so far ahead that the
Soviets could not keep up with U. S. investments. President
Reagan's procurement budget requests for the DON clearly
reflected the administration's intentions to make good on the
campaign promises.
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This study indicates that the turnaround in DON
procurement budgets actually began under President Carter.
The Reagan administration took this beginning and built on it
to such a degree that the investments of the 1980's resulted
in one of the largest peacetime buildups in U. S. Navy
history.
The DON procurement budget received special attention from
the Reagan presidency. The administration's plans called for
a rebuilding of the Navy into a six hundred ship fleet.
Although this goal was not achieved, the results of this
emphasis on DON investment have ensured that the Navy is more
ready to meet the challenges of the early 1990's than it was
to meet the challenges of the late 1970's.
A final conclusion that may be drawn involves a look to
the future. Changing world conditions, plus U.S. economic and
budget conditions, have resulted in calls for a reduced
military, which includes a shrinking of the Navy. As DOD
budgets reduce, the Navy can and should expect its procurement
budgets to decline also. Decisions concerning what types and
how many aircraft, ships, and other investment items to
acquire must be made with the expectation that fewer dollars
will be available to make the purchases.
A maritime strategy for meeting the obligations of the
U.S. Navy must be devised that takes account of reduced
procurement funding and the reduced capability that entails.
This strategy must permit the Navy to meet its goals and
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objectives without reverting to a "hollow force" structure
that pays only lip service to these commitments.
Although the growth in DON procurement budgets occurred
during an unequaled peacetime buildup period, total DON
procurement essentially followed historically established
patterns. That pattern is one where procurement budgets fare
well when funds appropriated by Congress are abundant and
where procurement budgets experience sharply decreasing budget
shares when appropriations dollars are tight.
As the Navy enters the 1990's, defense budgets are
shrinking in real terms and are expected to continue to do so.
It should be expected that DON procurement will continue to
follow historical trends and experience significant reductions
in current and real terms. As total military spending
becomes more tightly controlled by Congress and the President,





(in billions of current dollars)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
APN:
Combat Aircraft 4076 6022 6207 6185 6034
Airlift Aircraft 37 101 279 189 238
Trainer Aircraft 56 74 50 31 103
Other Aircraft 45 73 76 174 120
Aircraft Mods. 693 910 1161 1140 1773
Parts & Spares 1096 1527 1959 1728 1334
Supt. Equipment 251 313 424 392 628
Net Financing 0 8 28 320 668
Subtotal 6254 9028 10184 10159 10898
WPN:
Ballistic Mis. 876 926 667 616 265
Other Missiles 1341 1576 2024 2012 2823
Torpedos & Equip. 327 473 509 563 597
Other Weapons 194 191 159 157 188
Parts & Spares 0 0 0 0 0
Net Financing 28 0 88 424 480
Subtotal 2766 3166 3447 3772 4353
SCN:
Bal. Mis. Ships 1134 331 1527 1262 861
Missile Ships 3494 5141 11810 4682 5815
Amphibious Ships 388 340 469 1225 495
Mine Warfare 1510 996 760 606 469
Other Ships 1092 1795 1455 1644 1448
Net Financing 102 35 116 2065 2548
Subtotal 7720 8638 16137 11484 11636
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1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
OPN:
Ship Supt. Equip. 675 687 534 604 719
Com. Elect Equip. 1054 1155 1413 1465 1386
AV. Supt. Equip. 370 561 566 560 913
Ord. Supt. Equip. 597 827 695 853 1054
CEC Supt. Equip. 74 111 170 144 237
Sup. Supt. Equip. 69 76 88 58 94
Per./Coms. Equip. 191 212 228 205 386
Parts & Spares 0 0 0 0 0
Net Financing 0 0 -28 434 552
Subtotal 3030 3629 3666 4323 5341
PKC:
Ammunition 82 307 449 419 538
Weapons/Vehicles 99 433 446 362 426
Guided Missiles 101 214 240 161 274
Coms. & Elec. Eq. 91 322 434 304 280
Support Vehicles 87 152 186 293 233
Engineering Eq. 47 281 206 202 118
Parts & Spares 0 0 0 0 0
Net Financing 0 0 0 2 -52
Subtotal 507 1709 1961 1743 1817




(in billions of current dollars)
1986 1987 1988 1989
APN:
Combat Aircraft 5762 6430 5570 5794
Airlift Aircraft 209 118 18 2
Trainer Aircraft 199 77 375 80
Other Aircraft 507 298 433 360
Aircraft Mods. 1181 1657 1207 900
Parts & Spares 1181 1669 1350 1179
Supt. Equipment 629 551 509 540
Net Financing 828 -1432 -424 487
Subtotal 10496 9368 9038 9342
WPN:
Ballistic Missiles 550 1351 1533 2160
Other Missiles 3248 3069 2978 3103
Torpedos & Equip. 428 602 662 974
Other Weapons 159 283 100 110
Parts & Spares 83 150 109 110
Net Financing 503 -464 0 -371
Subtotal 4971 4991 5372 6086
SCN:
Bal. Missile Ships 1076 1710 1125 1226
Missile Ships 5245 7440 12188 6700
Amphibious Ships 900 419 834 591
Mine Warfare 3890 247 71 380
Other Ships 1222 1915 831 1901
Net Financing 1518 -2689 802 -1225
Subtotal 10350 9042 15851 9573
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1986 1987 1988 1989
OPN:
Ship Support Equip. 763 959 723 698
Comms. Elect. Equip. 1657 1860 1546 1411
AV. Support Equip. 867 877 748 553
Ord. Supt. Equip. 1069 1040 926 785
CEC Supt. Equip. 275 219 120 94
Sup. Supt. Equip. 78 88 81 94
Per./Coms. Equip. 430 590 447 469
Parts & Spares 141 279 267 542
Net Financing 823 -109 -501 39
Subtotal 6103 5803 4357 4685
PMC:
Ammunition 486 552 375 280
Weapons/Vehicles 125 117 97 180
Guided Missiles 262 234 297 325
Coms. & Elec. Eq. 220 356 312 278
Support Vehicles 303 176 81 21
Engineering Eq. 175 185 187 129
Parts & Spares 26 37 44 62
Net Financing -39 -223 -180 17
Subtotal 1558 1434 1213 1292




(in billicns of constant dollars)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
APN:
Combat Aircraft 5662 7867 7473 7748 7078
Airlift Aircraft 51 132 348 228 279
Trainer Aircraft 78 97 62 a37 121
Other Aircraft 63 95 95 210 141
Aircraft Mods. 963 1189 1449 1377 2080
Parts & Spares 1522 1995 2445 2088 1565
Supt. Equipment 349 409 529 474 737
Net Financing 0 10 35 387 784
Subtotal 8687 11794 12713 12274 12784
WPN:
Ballistic Mis. 1217 1210 833 744 311
Other Missiles 1863 2059 2527 2431 3311
Torpedos & Equip. 454 618 635 680 700
Other Weapons 269 250 198 190 221
Parts & Spares 0 0 0 0 0
Net Financing 39 0 110 512 563
Subtotal 3842 4136 4303 4557 5106
SCN:
Bal. Mis. Ships 1575 423 1906 1525 1010
Missile Ships 4853 6716 14742 5657 ;6821
Amphibious Ships 539 444 585 1480 581
Mine Warfare 2098 1301 949 732 550
Other Ships 1517 2345 1816 1986 1699
Net Financing 142 46 145 2495 2989
Subtotal 10724 11284 20144 13875 13649
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1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
OPN:
Ship Supt. Equip. 938 897 667 730 843
Com. Elect Equip. 1464 1509 1764 1770 1626
AV. Supt. Equip. 514 733 707 677 1071
Ord. Supt. Equip. 829 1080 868 1031 1236
CEC Supt. Equip. 103 145 212 174 278
Sup. Supt. Equip. 96 99 110 70 110
Per./Coms. Equip. 265 277 285 248 453
Parts & Spares 0 0 0 0 0
Net Financing 0 0 -35 524 648
Subtotal 4209 4741 4576 5223 6265
PMC:
Ammunition 114 401 560 506 631
Weapons/Vehicles 138 566 557 437 500
Guided Missiles 140 280 300 195 321
Coms. & Elec. Eq. 126 421 542 367 328
Support Vehicles 121 199 232 354 273
Engineering Eq. 65 367 257 244 138
Parts & Spares 0 0 0 0 0
Net Financing 0 0 0 2 -61
Subtotal 704 2233 2448 2106 2131




(in billions of constant dollars)
1986 1987 1988 1989
APN:
Combat Aircraft 6554 7078 5920 5963
Airlift Aircraft 238 130 198 2
Trainer Aircraft 226 85 399 82
Other Aircraft 577 328 460 371
Aircraft Mods. 1343 1824 1283 926
Parts & Spares 1343 1837 1435 1213
Supt. Equipment 716 607 531 556
Net Financing 942 -1576 -451 501
Subtotal 11939 10313 9607 9615
WPN:
Ballistic Missiles 626 1487 1629 2223
Other Missiles 3695 3378 3155 3194
Torpedos & Equip. 487 663 704 1002
Other Weapons 181 312 106 113
Parts & Spares 94 165 116 113
Net Financing 572 -511 0 -382
Subtotal 5655 5494 5710 6264
SCN:
Bal. Missile Ships 1224 1882 1196 1262
Missile Ships 5966 8190 12955 6896
Amphibious Ships 1024 461 886 608
Mine Warfare 442 272 75 391
Other Ships 1390 2108 883 1957
Net Financing 1727 -2960 852 -1261
Subtotal 11773 9954 16848 9853
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1986 1987 1988 1989
OPN:
Ship Support Equip. 843 868 1056 768
Comms. Elect. Equip. 1885 2048 ).643 1452
AV. Support Equip. 986 965 795 569
Ord. Supt. Equip. 1216 1145 984 808
CEC Supt. Equip. 313 241 128 97
Sup. Supt. Equip. 89 97 86 97
Per./Coms. Equip. 489 649 475 483
Parts & Spares 160 307 284 558
Net Financing 936 -120 -533 40
Subtotal 6942 6388 4631 4822
PMC:
Ammunition 553 608 399 288
Weapons/Vehicles 142 129 103 185
Guided Missiles 298 258 316 334
Coms. & Elec. Eq. 250 392 332 286
Support Vehicles 345 194 86 22
Engineering Eq. 199 204 199 133
Parts & Spares 30 41 47 64
Net Financing -44 -245 -191 17
Subtotal 1772 1579 1289 1330
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